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Corporate financing decisions: UK survey evidence 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite theoretical developments in recent years, our understanding of corporate capital 
structure remains incomplete. Prior empirical research has been dominated by archival 
regression studies which are limited in their ability to fully reflect the diversity found in 
practice. The present paper reports on a comprehensive survey of corporate financing 
decision-making in UK listed companies. A key finding is that firms are heterogeneous in 
their capital structure policies. About half of the firms seek to maintain a target debt level, 
consistent with trade-off theory, but 60% claim to follow a financing hierarchy, consistent 
with pecking order theory. These two theories are not viewed by respondents as either 
mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Many of the theoretical determinants of debt levels are 
widely accepted by respondents, in particular the importance of interest tax shield, financial 
distress, agency costs and also, at least implicitly, information asymmetry.  Results also 
indicate that cross-country institutional differences have a significant impact on financial 
decisions. 
 
 
Keywords: Capital structure; survey; trade-off theory; pecking order theory; agency theory; 
institutional differences. 
 
  
  
Corporate financing decisions: UK survey evidence 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the seminal publication of Modigliani and Miller (1958), corporate finance researchers 
have devoted considerable effort to investigating capital structure decisions (e.g. Myers, 1977, 
1984). Significant progress has been made in understanding the determinants of corporate 
capital structure with an increased emphasis on financial contracting theory (see, for example, 
Barclay and Smith, 1995; Mehran et al., 1999; Graham et al., 1998 and, for an international 
view, Rajan and Zingales, 1995). This theory suggests that firm characteristics such as 
business risk and investment opportunity set affect contracting costs. In turn, these costs 
impact on the choice between alternative forms of finance such as debt and equity, and 
between different classes of fixed-claim finance such as debt and leasing. Recent studies have 
begun to focus on dynamic aspects of capital structure (Ozkan, 2001; Antoniou et al., 2002; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Welch, 2004; Leary and Roberts, 2003; Flannery and Rangan, 
2003). However, our understanding remains incomplete and this has prompted a large number 
of recent studies in the area of capital structure. 
 
The approach adopted in most studies seeks to explain observed capital structures in terms of 
factors felt likely to be important, usually using large-scale cross-sectional (and time series) 
regression methods. This approach involves identification of the broad consensus (average) 
behaviour of firms. It cannot capture the diversity in behaviour that can arise from firms 
adopting different capital structure policies, and which would lead to different functional 
forms in the regression models. Further, even in dynamic time series studies, only indirect 
inferences can be made about the financing decision-making process as only the outcome of 
the process is studied. Writers in the area are beginning to argue that it is necessary to 
augment the dominant archival method by the use of different empirical approaches that offer 
greater insight into the behavioural aspects of the decision process (Tufano, 2001).1  Survey 
methods and clinical methods are both candidates in this regard. 
 
The main aim of the present paper is to report on a comprehensive survey of the corporate 
financing decision-making process in UK companies to, inter alia, enable a comparison 
between practice and extant theories of capital structure. This requires knowledge of the 
measures that managers use, the factors that affect the choices made, and the theories that are 
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 being applied (either explicitly or implicitly, partially or completely) as well as knowledge of 
those factors and theories that they apparently disregard. Thus, the objective is to understand 
how companies determine their overall financing strategy, why they choose a particular mix 
of financing instruments, and why they choose to limit borrowings or set up spare borrowing 
capacity. The method explicitly allows a description of the diversity of capital structure 
practice. This then opens up the possibility for future research to investigate the specific 
factors or characteristics that encourage firms to choose different financing policies.  A 
secondary objective is to compare the results from the UK with those of recent survey studies 
of financing decisions in the US and Europe to investigate the impact of cross-country 
institutional differences (e.g.La Porta et al., 1997; 1998). 
 
One of the key findings of the study is that firms are heterogeneous in their capital structure 
policies. About half of the firms seek to maintain a target debt level, consistent with trade-off 
theory. However, 60% of responding firms argued that they follow a financing hierarchy, 
consistent with pecking order theory. These two theories were not viewed by respondents as 
either mutually exclusive or exhaustive. Such observations raise doubts about the usefulness 
of adopting large-scale archival methods to investigate capital structure determinants since 
they cannot, in standard form, describe such diversity. 
 
Respondents identified ‘ensuring the long-term survivability of the company’ as the most 
important factor in determining debt levels. By contrast, in their major US survey, Graham 
and Harvey (2001) (hereafter G&H) found ‘financial flexibility’ to be most important, closely 
followed by ‘credit rating’. It is likely that these differences reflect variations in institutional 
arrangements between the two countries. Bankruptcy law in the UK is relatively strict in 
enforcing creditor rights, potentially encouraging conservatism by management in debt level 
decisions (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). While there was evidence elsewhere in the present survey 
that UK respondents valued flexibility, credit rating was not considered significant; a similar 
result was found across most of Europe in the survey by Brounen, de Jong and Koedijk (2004) 
(hereafter BJK). The low level of importance of ‘credit rating’ reflects the less developed 
corporate bond market in the UK. Finally, tax code differences between the UK and US are 
likely to contribute to the relatively low importance attached to tax deductibility of interest in 
the present study. 
 
The present survey seeks to provide a comprehensive and reliable survey of the corporate 
financing decisions of UK listed companies. It contributes on several dimensions. First, 
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 similar to G&H, it is based on a large number (198) of responses from a single country and 
the likelihood of representative results is considerably increased by the response rate of 23%, 
significantly higher than any of the three recent surveys. Second, it focuses exclusively on 
listed companies in contrast with G&H and BJK whose samples include 37% and 70% private 
firms respectively; BJK include just 37 UK public firms in their sample. Third, the present 
study confronts the pecking order theory directly in a series of focused questions. Finally, it 
explicitly considers the mutual exclusivity of the two main theories of capital structure. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides a review of relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature and section three outlines the sample and data collection 
procedures employed. The results are presented in section four, followed by a summary and 
discussion in section five and a conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE 
 
The capital structure literature is extensive and only a brief selective summary is provided 
below. For a more comprehensive treatment see the major review by Harris and Raviv (1991). 
 
(i) Capital structure: theory 
A basic model of capital structure determination has derived from the with-taxes Modigliani 
and Miller (1958, 1963) model with expansion to incorporate the financial distress costs of 
debt. This traditional static trade-off theory can be characterised by the assumption that 
capital structure is optimised with management weighing up the relative advantage of the tax-
shield benefits of debt against the increased likelihood of incurring debt-related bankruptcy 
costs (Myers, 1984).  
 
However, in seeking to model the wide diversity of capital structure practice, a number of 
additional factors have been proposed in the literature. First, the use of debt finance can 
reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders by increasing the managers’ share of 
equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and by reducing the ‘free’ cash available for managers’ 
personal benefits (Jensen, 1986). It may also encourage managers to perform better in order to 
reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy, which is costly for managers (Grossman and Hart, 1982). 
Conflicts between debt-providers and shareholders arise because the debt contract gives 
shareholders an incentive to invest sub-optimally in very risky projects. This implies an 
agency cost of using debt finance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that an optimal capital 
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 structure can be obtained by trading off the agency costs of debt against the benefit of debt, in 
what might be termed an extended trade-off model. 
 
Second, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, under asymmetric information, equity may be 
mispriced by the market. If firms finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing may be 
so severe that new investors gain more of the project NPV to the detriment of existing 
shareholders. This may lead to an ‘underinvestment’ problem since such projects will be 
rejected even if the NPV is positive. This underinvestment can be reduced by financing the 
project using a security that is less likely to be mispriced by the market. Internal funds involve 
no undervaluation and even debt that is not too risky will be preferred to equity. Myers (1984) 
refers to this as the pecking order theory of capital structure. The description follows earlier 
empirical work by Donaldson (1961), in which he observed that managers preferred to fund 
investment initially from retained profits rather than use outside funds. This preference led 
firms to adopt dividend policies that reflected their anticipated need for investment funds, 
policies which managers were reluctant to substantially change. If retained profits exceeded 
investment needs then debt would be repaid. If external finance was required, firms tended 
first to issue the safest security, debt, and only issued equity as a last resort.  
 
Under this model, there is no well-defined target mix of debt and equity finance. Each firm’s 
observed debt ratio reflects its cumulative requirements for external finance. Generally, 
profitable firms will borrow less because they can rely on internal funds. The preference for 
internal equity implies that firms will use less debt than suggested by the trade-off theory. 
Further, firms are more likely to create financial slack to finance future projects. 
 
Other factors that have been invoked to help explain the diversity of observed capital 
structures include: management behaviour (Williamson, 1988); corporate strategy (Barton and 
Gordon, 1988); firm-stakeholder interaction (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998, Ch. 16); and 
corporate control issues (Harris and Raviv, 1988, 1991).  
 
A significant strand of the empirical literature has sought to distinguish which of the two main 
theories best explains capital structure practice (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama 
and French, 2002; Adedeji, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Implicit in such testing is that the 
theories have elements that are mutually exclusive. While the theories in their basic form do 
lead to a set of ‘precisely opposite’ predictions (Barclay and Smith, 1999), there is increasing 
recognition that neither theory is able, independently, to explain the complexity encountered 
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 in practice. This is particularly true when seeking a unified theory to explain the broader array 
of corporate financial policy choices (Barclay and Smith, 1999).  
 
(ii) The impact of institutional differences on financial decisions 
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) consider that a country’s legal system is the main determinant of 
external finance availability. They identify common law countries (such as the UK, US) as 
affording good legal protection to shareholders with French-civil-law countries affording less 
protection. Legal protection for creditors against managers, usually relevant in situations of 
financial distress, is also typically strong in common law countries (including the UK). 
However, the US is an important exception in this respect and is identified as one of the most 
anti-creditor countries. Both the UK and the US are typified by good law enforcement and 
relatively low concentration of company ownership. However, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002) suggest that any deficiencies in the legal system can be compensated, at 
least partially, by a combination of banking system administration and regulation. 
 
In their study of international capital structures, Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1422) argue that 
it is important to test the robustness of US findings in different environments. They identify as 
potentially important the cross-country differences in tax and bankruptcy codes, in the market 
for corporate control and in the historical role played by banks and security markets. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) confirm that the level of financial markets 
development has a significant impact on companies’ financing policies. Further, while capital 
structure decisions in developing countries are affected by the same factors as in developed 
countries, Booth et al. (2001) argue that the persistent cross-country differences suggest that 
our understanding of the impact of different institutional features remains incomplete. 
 
As context for the present study, the UK can be characterised as having a broadly similar 
financial and legal environment to the US. It has a common law legal system with good 
investor protection, well-developed financial markets and an active market for corporate 
control. Bank finance and inter-company ownership relationships play relatively smaller roles 
than in some countries. The most obvious differences between the UK and US relate to tax 
and bankruptcy codes and the size of the corporate bond market (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
 
(iii) Capital structure: empirical evidence 
In the main, two empirical approaches have been used to obtain evidence on factors that affect 
corporate financing decisions. The first approach, adopted in the majority of studies, seeks to 
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 explain observed capital structures in terms of factors felt likely to be important, usually using 
cross-sectional regression methods. Based on an informal meta-analysis of twenty papers 
across several countries, Thomson (2003) identifies several key features of firms that seem to 
be related to debt ratios across a wide range of environments and through time: size (+), 
earnings variability (+), asset tangibility (+), profitability (–), investment opportunity set (–) 
and industry. The evidence on tax influence is weak, perhaps reflecting the endogeneity 
between tax rates and financing choice (Graham et al., 1998). With a few exceptions, UK 
cross-sectional studies (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Lasfer, 1995; Adedeji, 1998; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 1998) and panel regression studies (Ozkan, 2001; Antoniou et al., 2002; Bevan and 
Danbolt; 2004) generally find similar relationships to those found in the US and elsewhere. 
Two of the robust observations cause specific difficulties for theory: the negative relationship 
between debt ratio and profitability is consistent with the logic of pecking order theory but 
inconsistent with trade-off theory; the negative investment opportunity set observation 
supports trade-off theory but not pecking order theory.  
 
Other UK studies include an early one by Marsh (1982), who investigated security issues and 
found that companies are heavily influenced by market conditions and the past history of 
security prices in choosing between debt and equity. He also provided evidence that 
companies appear to make their choice of financing instruments as if they have target levels 
of debt in mind. These debt levels are themselves functions of company size, bankruptcy risk 
and asset composition. The related study by Walsh and Ryan (1997) found both agency and 
tax considerations were important in determining debt and equity issues. Lasfer (1999) 
investigated the determinants of debt structure, maturity and priority structures and found 
significant differences across company size; in particular, the relationship between debt and 
agency costs only applies to large companies whereas small company debt appears to be 
driven by profitability. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) focused on the difficulties in measuring 
gearing and found that debt determinants appear to vary significantly between short-term and 
long-term components of debt. The pecking order theory prediction that there should be a 
negative relationship between the dividend payout ratio and investment was confirmed by 
Adedeji (1998). In a UK replication and extension of the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
test of pecking order against trade-off theory, Adedeji (2002) found mixed evidence, with 
neither theory dominant. Overall, the evidence for the UK (as for the US) is somewhat 
inconclusive. While various individual factors can be identified as important, neither of the 
two major theories is capable independently of adequately explaining the outcomes of firms’ 
financing decisions in practice.  
 6
  
Recent studies have begun to focus on dynamic aspects of capital structure such as whether, 
as implied in the trade-off theory, firms engage in capital structure rebalancing. Ozkan (2001) 
provided evidence that UK firms do have target ratios and adjust to the target ratio relatively 
quickly. Antoniou et al. (2002) showed that firms in three European countries (including the 
UK) adjust their debt ratios to attain target structures, but at different speeds, suggesting that 
environmental and traditions are also important determinants. Baker and Wurgler (2002) and 
Welch (2004) suggested that US firms fail to rebalance in response to changes in leverage 
resulting from equity issues, or market changes in equity values, respectively. By contrast, 
Leary and Roberts (2003) argued that frictions in the capital markets encourage firms to 
adjust capital structure, but that this adjustment is relatively infrequent, leading to ‘extended 
excursions away from their targets’ (Myers, 1984). They found that US firms behave as if 
they follow a dynamic trade-off policy in which they actively rebalance leverage to stay 
within an optimal range. Flannery and Rangan (2003) extended this idea by developing a 
model that allowed firms’ target capital structures to vary over time and for firms to adjust 
gradually towards the target. They confirmed that US firms operate with a target leverage 
ratio, and more than halve the distance to the target within two years. Finally, one of the 
major observations contrary to the trade-off theory, the strong inverse relationship between 
profitability and leverage has been shown to be reconcilable by consideration of mean 
reversion in earnings (Sarkar and Zapatero, 2003). While the evidence is far from conclusive, 
on balance it seems that some form of target or target range is employed by firms, consistent 
with the logic of trade-off theory.  
 
However, using the large-scale regression approach invariably involves identification of the 
average behaviour of firms and does not measure its diversity. In particular, it does not allow 
for the possibility that some firms may choose to adopt a hierarchical ‘pecking-order view’ of 
finance while others, perhaps the majority, adopt a target capital structure.2 Further, its focus 
on the outcomes of the financing decision-making process necessarily limits our 
understanding of the process itself.  An alternative approach is to ask company managers 
directly about their attitudes and behaviour regarding corporate financing using the survey 
method. This allows both the process and diversity of practice to be investigated, offering a 
richer understanding of practice. 
 
Prior surveys of general capital structure issues have been mainly US-based (e.g. Donaldson, 
1961; Scott and Johnson, 1982; Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989; Norton, 1989; Graham and 
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 Harvey, 2001). However, there is one published study on Australia (Allen, 1991) and a few 
cross-country comparisons, including the two recent European surveys, which have typically 
incorporated a small sample of UK companies (Stonehill et al., 1975; Allen, 1999; Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2004; Brounen et al., 2004). To the best of our knowledge, there is only one prior  UK 
study (Fawthrop and Terry, 1975). Table 1 provides a brief summary of the survey studies. 
 
< TABLE 1 about here > 
 
Graham and Harvey (2001) conducted a major recent US survey of views about the cost of 
capital, capital budgeting and capital structure. The responses relating to capital structure 
suggest that firms are concerned about financial flexibility and credit ratings when issuing 
debt, and earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation when issuing equity. 
They found some evidence to support both the pecking order theory and trade-off theory but 
little evidence that executives are concerned about asset substitution, asymmetric information, 
transaction costs, free cash flows, or personal taxes. 
 
In their international replication and extension of G&H, BJK surveyed 313 CFOs across four 
European countries (UK, the Netherlands, Germany and France), including 68 from the UK. 
They also found financial flexibility to be the most important debt determinant but, while 
consistent with the pecking order theory, this was not driven by asymmetric information. 
Corporate finance practice appeared to be affected mostly by firm size and to a lesser extent 
by shareholder orientation, but national factors were relatively weak. The samples in these 
two studies include 37% and 70% of private companies, respectively, with just 37 UK public 
firms in the latter study. While this increases the potential broadness of the results’ 
applicability, great care needs to be exercised in applying the overall results to either sector. 
The private/public results differ on many dimensions in the G&H tables but separate results 
are not reported in BJK. Indeed, the very high proportion of private company respondents in 
BJK may have induced a significant bias against finding national differences, as private 
companies are by definition not exposed to the financial markets (i.e. stock markets and 
quoted debt). 
 
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) surveyed 87 managers from large listed firms across 16 European 
countries on the determinants of capital structure; respondents included 10 (7% response rate) 
from the UK and 2 from Ireland. Financial flexibility was again found to be the primary 
concern when issuing debt, and earnings per share dilution when issuing equity. Managers 
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 value hedging considerations and use ‘windows of opportunity’ when raising capital. 
Companies’ financing policies are influenced by both institutional environment and 
international operations. Overall, they conclude that companies determine capital structure by 
trading off costs and benefits of financing. However, the results need to be considered 
cautiously in light of the small sample size, both overall and for many of the individual 
countries. 
 
In the 30 year-old UK study, Fawthrop and Terry’s (1975) primary focus was on the use of 
leasing finance but they also included a small number of questions concerning attitudes to 
debt. Almost all respondents acknowledged that they would use debt to finance capital 
expenditure but that there was a limit to the amount of debt a company ought to use. This 
limit was likely to be set in relation to the debt to equity ratio or ‘prior charges cover’. The 
size of this limit was not explicitly explored in the survey but a gearing limit of 40% was 
‘often’ mentioned, without justification, in interview discussions. Unfortunately, the relatively 
early stage of theory development and the many environmental changes since 1974 severely 
limit the relevance of the results for current use. 
 
Survey-based analysis complements both the more common research method based on large 
sample regressions and intensive small-sample case studies. The use of multiple methods 
facilitates the triangulation of results.3 Our choice of survey approach in the current study 
reflects a desire to investigate the diversity of financial structure practice and aspects of the 
financing decision-making process itself rather than just the outcome of the process. 
 
3. METHODS 
 
(i) Sample selection 
The sample of finance directors was based on the population of industrial and commercial UK 
listed companies contained in the UKQI list on Datastream in March 2000. The questionnaire 
was sent in July 2000 to a systematic sample of two-thirds (831) of this population. Non-
response is a significant, and increasing, problem in the survey method and so a relatively 
large initial sample was used to provide a satisfactory absolute number of responses to 
support meaningful statistical analysis. 
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 (ii) Questionnaire design and administration procedures 
The questionnaire content was based upon a review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
in the area, including previous surveys. This was used to produce a draft questionnaire that 
was piloted on two finance directors (out of ten companies randomly selected from the non-
sample balance of the population); a technical representative of the Association of Corporate 
Treasurers; and two professors of finance. The questionnaire content and terminology was 
revised accordingly. 
 
The full questionnaire covering capital structure and leasing decisions was 16 pages long 
(including covers). It was accompanied by an explanatory covering letter that assured the 
confidentiality of responses. Each questionnaire was numbered to facilitate follow-up 
procedures and to enable the characteristics of responding companies to be identified. The 
contents page included general instructions for completion together with definitions of various 
key terms used in the questionnaire (capital structure, debt finance, equity finance and target 
capital structure). Seven pages were devoted to capital structure issues and asked for 
responses to a potential total of 98 question elements.4 Section A included questions relating 
to the determinants of the responding company’s capital structure. Section B sought views on 
general statements regarding the determinants of capital structure. The final section asked for 
brief information about the respondent. The questionnaire used various question forms 
including those requiring yes/no answers, numerical estimates, ranking of alternatives, closed-
form questions adopting a five-point Likert scale with verbal anchors and a small number of 
open-ended questions. 
 
Many of the standard response-enhancing techniques were adopted including: designing a 
clear questionnaire layout; piloting; defining key terms at the start of the questionnaire; 
addressing the covering letter to a specific named individual (all finance director details and 
addresses were individually checked by telephone); covering letters signed individually by 
researchers; follow-up letters approximately 10 and 20 days after the initial request; stamped 
reply envelopes (rather than reply-paid envelopes); requesting non-respondents to return the 
questionnaire (Bourque and Fielder, 1995; Mangione, 1995). 
 
(iii) Further analysis procedures 
The extent to which respondents’ opinions were related to company size, gearing level and 
industry group was also investigated.5 Several arguments link company size to capital 
structure decisions. First, large firms are typically more diversified and, therefore, less likely 
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 to suffer financial distress. Second, small firms are often restricted from using long-term debt 
and equity because of large fixed issuing costs, and tend to finance by short-term bank loans 
(Marsh, 1982). Third, small firms may be subject to greater agency costs because they are 
more flexible and better able to increase the risk of investment projects. Thus, lenders may be 
less willing to provide debt finance to small firms (Grinblatt and Titman, 1998). 
 
These arguments suggest that, in general, large firms: 
• have less concern than small firms about financial distress and agency costs of using debt; 
• enjoy greater potential benefits from the debt tax shield, partly because distress/agency 
costs are lower and more directly because large firms are less likely to benefit from the 
‘small company’ corporation tax rate of 20%;6 
• have less concentrated managerial ownership suggesting: 
- higher agency costs resulting from shareholder-manager conflict 
- lower concern about corporate control issues than small firm owner-managers; 
• have greater influence over their capital structure than small firms, as a result of 
transaction costs for market-based finance; thus, policies of maintaining a target debt 
level, or following a hierarchy, may be more sustainable for large firms; and 
• have greater ability to maintain financial slack, given lenders reluctance to provide debt 
finance to small firms. 
 
Respondents were classified into three equal-sized sub-samples of small, medium and large 
companies based on total assets, with comparisons being made between the responses from 
the large and small sub-samples. 
 
A firm’s current level of gearing may influence a respondent’s perception of the factors that 
are important in determining debt levels. For example, high geared firms might consider the 
interest tax shield benefit to debt and financial distress costs to be of great significance. 
Similarly, cash flows/income flows and restrictive covenants might be of greater concern. 
High gearing might encourage firms to seek to control debt by setting targets. They might 
have less opportunity to maintain financial slack if they are already functioning at or near 
their debt capacity. However, since firms with low debt capacity may also find financial slack 
hard to maintain, the relationship between gearing and financial slack is difficult to predict. 
The ratio of total debt to the market value of equity was used to identify equal-sized sub-
samples of high, medium and low geared companies and enable comparisons of responses 
between high and low geared companies. 
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Prior research has identified a firm’s industry as a potentially important determinant of capital 
structure. Firms characterised by high operating risk are more susceptible to financial distress. 
Those in cyclical sectors will suffer greater variability in profitability, while some, such as 
information technology firms, are subject to technological risks and typically employ firm-
specific intangible assets. Further, high growth sectors may experience high agency costs 
through restrictions imposed by lenders to reduce the greater opportunities for asset 
substitution. Maintenance of financial slack might be preferred by firms in high growth 
sectors with ample investment opportunities. Also, different product market or competitive 
environments across industries may also affect capital structure decisions. Respondents were 
classified into nine broad industrial groupings based on Stock Exchange sectors (basic 
industries, cyclical consumer goods, cyclical services, information technology, general 
industries, non-cyclical consumer goods, non-cyclical services, resources and utilities). 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
After describing the response profile, this section covers six key areas: debt ratios; target 
capital structure; hierarchy in capital structure; maintenance of spare borrowing capacity; 
determinants of capital structure, and further analysis of size, gearing and industry effects. 
 
(i) Response profile 
From the mailing to 831 finance directors, 192 usable responses were received representing a 
response rate of 23%.7 Six additional responses were received from those who requested a 
copy of the questionnaire when replying to a questionnaire on a related topic,8 giving a total 
of 198 usable responses. Prior research studies involving similar subjects have obtained 
response rates of between 9% and 35%. The response rate in the present study is much higher 
than the 9%, 5% and 12% obtained in the recent studies by G&H, BJK and Bancel and Mittoo 
(2004) respectively, and given the length of the questionnaire can be considered good. 
 
Three tests for response bias were performed. First, responding companies were compared 
with the population of UKQI companies on the basis of size (measured as total assets). A 2-
tail t-test confirmed no difference between the sample mean total assets and the population 
mean even at the 10% significance level.9 Second, the respondent companies were formed 
into nine broad industrial categories based on Stock Exchange sectors and a χ2 goodness-of-fit 
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 test confirmed that the sample companies were distributed similarly to companies in the 
UKQI population (χ2 = 9.39; p= 0.310). 
 
Finally, the responses of early responders were compared to those of late responders on the 
assumption that late responders are similar to non-responders (Oppenheim, 1966). As there 
were no particularly ‘key’ questions in the questionnaire on which to focus, a series of tests 
appropriate to the question form (i.e. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney, t-test, χ2) was conducted for 
the 64 closed-form question elements. As only three significant differences (at the 5% level) 
emerged, the sample of respondent finance directors is likely to be representative of the 
population of UKQI companies and so non-response is unlikely to be a major issue in 
interpreting the results of the survey.10
 
A further factor that can affect the validity of responses is the suitability of individual 
respondents, in terms of knowledge about the issues under investigation. All of those who 
confirmed their corporate position in the final section of the questionnaire were senior 
financial personnel likely to be knowledgeable about capital structure issues: finance directors 
(63%), treasurers (13%), financial controller (8%) or similar senior personnel (16%). 
 
An important contextual element in understanding respondents’ views concerns their 
perceptions of stock market efficiency. This was assessed by asking respondents to indicate 
the percentage of time that their ordinary shares are fairly priced by the market. Answers 
suggested that most respondents do not accept the notion of market efficiency. For example, 
86% felt that the market fairly priced their shares less than three-quarters of the time,11 
suggesting that managers generally do not believe the market to be efficient.  This compares 
with approximately 52% in the earlier US study by Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989), reflecting 
either a decline in the acceptance of market efficiency or perhaps national differences in its 
acceptance. 
 
(ii) Debt levels 
In response to the question ‘Does your company believe that there is a maximum amount of 
debt financing that should not be surpassed?’, 69% of respondents responded affirmatively. 
Thus, while the majority of companies believe that the debt level has to be constrained, a 
significant minority (31%) do not believe this is necessary. Of those companies that believe 
debt should be limited, most (91%) indicated that their maximum debt level is defined by 
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 reference to a limit placed on balance sheet and/or income statement gearing measures; just 
4% indicated that maintenance of a bond rating was important. 
 
In a separate question, 75% of respondents confirmed that they measured financial gearing.12 
Of the five different measures offered, interest cover and the net debt to equity ratio were 
clearly favoured. These had mean scores of 4.1 and 4.0 (on a scale from 1 (not used) to 5 
(very important)), and were identified as ‘important’ or ‘very important’ by 80% and 75% of 
the companies that measured gearing, respectively. Of the respondents who measure gearing 
and are also engaged in leasing, approximately 75% claimed to recognise fixed finance and 
operating lease payments in calculating financial gearing measures. This could be taken to 
imply that a significant proportion of companies use a version of the ‘fixed charge cover’ 
measure; however, such a measure was not proposed as an alternative in the open-ended 
option for gearing measures. The majority of respondents that measure debt to equity ratios 
use book values (83%) rather than theoretically-supported market values (12%); 5% use both 
measures. Scott and Johnson (1982) found that 92% of their US respondents used book values 
rather than market values, suggesting that the practice may be pervasive. This observation is 
entirely consistent with our finding (section 4(i) above) that managers’ do not generally 
believe the stock market to be efficient. Why would a manager adopt a policy-relevant 
measure that is based on share price, which is not within his control, is highly volatile and 
which he believes to be incorrect much of the time? Indeed, the use of book values may also 
have some theoretical justification since these are related to the value of assets in place rather 
than the value of intangibles and growth opportunities (Myers, 1984). Importantly, managers’ 
use of book values also helps to explain why research using market value measures of equity 
finds that firms do not seem to adjust their capital structure to changes in equity values 
(Welch, 2004).  
 
(iii) Target capital structure 
In the trade-off theory of capital structure, companies are said to operate with a target 
debt/equity ratio at which the costs and benefits of issuing debt are balanced. Table 2 (Panels 
A to C) summarises the responses to a group of questions that focussed specifically on this 
theory. Panel A shows that approximately half of the companies (51%) indicated that they did 
maintain a target capital structure; of these, 73% claimed it to be ‘flexible’ and 27% 
‘reasonably strict’. The proportion having a target is similar to the 59% reported for UK 
companies by BJK, which is in the mid-range for Europe (low: 35% for France; high: 73% for 
Netherlands) but much lower than the 81% for US companies (G&H). Panel B shows that 
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 targets ranged from 0% to 300% with a mean (median) of 45% (40%) and with 80% of 
companies indicating a target of 50% or less debt. Fawthrop and Terry (1975) reported a 
similar group norm limit of debt financing of 40% in the very different economic environment 
over 25 years ago.  
 
< TABLE 2 about here > 
 
Even for companies with target debt levels, fluctuations in actual debt levels may be observed 
over time. This may be because the targets themselves are flexible, or because transaction 
costs lead to ‘lumpy’ changes in debt or equity levels, or because the actual, or perceived, 
costs and benefits associated with the use of debt change over time. Two-thirds (67%) of 
companies with target debt levels formally reviewed their target on a regular basis. 
Companies that did not review the targets regularly were asked, in an open-ended question, to 
specify what would trigger a review. The two most frequently quoted responses were that 
there was a continuous review of the capital structure target, or that reviews coincided with 
substantial acquisition, merger and investment activities. 
 
Finally, to assess the main ‘drivers’ of capital structure targets, respondents were asked to 
rank nine potential influences in setting target capital structure ratios. Panel C of Table 2 
suggests that the main force in setting target capital structure seems to come from within the 
company: company senior management were ranked the most important, significantly ahead 
of other potential influences. Thus, capital structure seems to be internally rather than 
externally constrained. 
 
(iv) Hierarchy in capital structure 
In the pecking order theory of capital structure, companies are said to relate profit and growth 
opportunities to their long-term target dividend pay-out ratios in order to minimise the need 
for external funds. Investment opportunities and dividend pay-out, therefore, dictate the 
amount of external financing. The flexibility of the financing decision in relation to 
investment and dividend decisions was investigated by asking respondents: ‘Given an 
attractive new growth opportunity that could not be taken without departing from your 
existing capital structure, cutting dividend or selling off other assets, what action is your 
company most likely to take?’. 86% said that the company would deviate from existing 
capital structure, 15% would sell off other assets, 5% would forgo the growth opportunity, 
just 2% would cut dividends with 2% answering ‘don’t know’.13 Companies with a target 
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 capital structure were less likely to deviate from their existing capital structure than 
companies that had no target (χ2 = 9.12; p = 0.003). 
 
The next question focused directly on the pecking order theory by asking ‘Does your 
company follow a hierarchy in which the most favoured sources of finance are exhausted 
before other sources?’. 60% answered affirmatively and were asked to rank eight listed 
sources of finance. Both finance and operating leases were included in order to determine, for 
the first time, how leasing ranks in relation to other sources of finance. A summary of the 
rankings is shown in Table 3. 
  
< TABLE 3 about here > 
 
Consistent with the pecking order theory, internal reserves were most favoured by 
respondents, followed by straight debt. There was a significant gap before the third-ranked 
group of finance sources (finance leases, operating leases and ordinary shares), with each of 
this third group subject to a high variation (standard deviation) in ranking. The similarity in 
mean rank between finance and operating leases is perhaps surprising given the predominant 
and prolific use of operating leases in recent years (Beattie at al., 1998). 
 
As stated above, some prior research appears to assume that the pecking order and trade-off 
theories are competing descriptors of company practice. Table 4 investigates this crucial 
assumption by providing a cross-tabulation between the two views. 60% of respondents 
claimed to follow a hierarchy and 50% a target capital structure. However, 32% claimed to 
follow both and 22% to follow neither. If the two theories are perceived as mutually exclusive 
by respondents, a negative association would be expected. This was not found, suggesting that 
companies do not make their capital structure decisions consistent with either of these theories 
exclusively. A broadly similar result was found earlier in the US where 26% of ‘hierarchy’ 
companies also claimed to have a target debt ratio (compared with 54% in the present study). 
Inter alia, this led Norton (1989) to conclude that ‘firms seem to use an eclectic approach 
when considering financing alternatives’.  
 
< TABLE 4 about here > 
 
One possible explanation for these observations is that when a manager is faced with a 
financing decision at a particular point in time, he may be influenced to a greater or lesser 
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 extent by the reasoning underpinning both of the main theories. For example, imagine a 
manager with a belief that information asymmetry and transaction costs are so large for his 
firm that he adopts a fundamental pecking order theory approach to financing. The firm has 
been a net investor in recent years, with a deficit of internal resources (retained profit), so has 
been increasing its borrowings to the high current level. At this point in time, the manager has 
to decide whether to raise more debt or issue equity, and the major consideration that is likely 
to affect the current decision will be the relative costs. For debt, these will be the direct after-
tax interest cost, transaction costs, as well as potential agency costs and, given the high debt 
level, significant distress costs, all costs typically associated with trade-off theory. For equity, 
it will be the equity required rate of return, transaction costs, together with information 
asymmetry costs. Thus, while the primary approach for the firm is based on pecking order 
theory, the current decision may be driven mainly by trade-off theory considerations. 
Effectively, the firm has a maximum amount of debt that it believes is optimal and so at this 
stage in the financing cycle it does have a target. How would the manager reply to the 
questions about whether the firm follows a hierarchy and whether it has a target debt level? 
He might answer yes to both, or recognising that the specific decision had elements of both 
theories, he might answer no to both since he may not consider he is exclusively adopting one 
theory or the other. 
 
On the other hand, imagine a manager who typically seeks to minimise financing costs, by 
balancing the overall agency and distress costs of debt with the tax benefit (a trade-off theory 
manager). While operating with a target debt level, he may be quite happy to deviate from 
that level in the short-term, for example by using internal funds because of transaction costs 
(or even inertia). Thus he may be acting, in the short-term, within a hierarchy of financing 
sources. The first manager is long-term pecking-order, short-term trade-off and vice versa for 
the second manager. A similar line of argument, which he called ‘modified pecking order’, 
was tentatively put forward by Myers (1984) when seeking to reconcile theory and financing 
practice. Frank and Goyal (2003) provided an alternative description when concluding that the 
need for outside funds, rather than being the driving factor in capital structure decisions, was 
simply one factor among many that firms trade off. They suggested that the informational 
asymmetry aspects in the pecking order theory could most usefully be incorporated as an 
additional factor in a generalised version of the trade-off model.  
 
The observation here that neither of the main theories is dominant helps to explain the 
diversity of evidence from empirical research studies and suggests that future theoretical work 
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 might profitably consider ways of synthesising the key elements from both theories. To 
support these theoretical advances, empirical work, using intensive interview-based methods, 
could seek to understand the contingent nature of financing decisions (i.e., the circumstances 
in which each of the main approaches dominates). 
 
(v) Maintenance of spare borrowing capacity 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that companies are likely to maintain spare borrowing 
capacity (financial slack) to avoid the need for external funds. Table 5 reports the responses to 
four questions investigating financial slack. Panel A shows that 59% of companies 
acknowledged a policy for maintaining spare borrowing capacity. For the respondents able to 
quantify the level, the estimated slack ranged between 0% and 100% of existing total long-
term debt with a majority (64%) within the 1-25% range; the mean was 29% (Panel B). Most 
of these companies used an overdraft facility as the source of slack with secured and 
unsecured loans, and leasing/hire purchase as other significant sources (Panel C). All of the 
four offered reasons why companies might maintain slack were accepted by a substantial 
proportion of respondents: unplanned opportunities; for acquisitions; as a reserve for crisis; 
and for special projects (Panel D). 
 
< TABLE 5 about here > 
 
Thus, there is some evidence consistent with the pecking order theory suggestion of the need 
for financial flexibility. However, flexibility is also important for reasons unrelated to the 
theory (Opler et al., 1999). Further, under the pecking order theory, companies adopt a 
hierarchy of financial sources and are likely to maintain financial slack. This expected 
positive association is not evident in a cross-tabulation between responses to the two 
questions about hierarchy and slack (χ2 = 0.39; p = 0.534).  
 
(vi) Determinants of capital structure 
The factors determining the choice of capital structure were explored in two questions, the 
first dealing specifically with the responding company’s decisions and the second relating 
more generally to decisions by listed UK companies. By framing the second question more 
generally, the potentially sensitive nature of a firm-specific question can be reduced. For 
example, a respondent might not recognise (and/or acknowledge) agency problems in his/her 
own firm but might accept that other firms suffer from agency problems. 
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 In the first question, respondents were asked the relative importance of thirteen factors in 
choosing an appropriate amount of total debt for their company. Panel A of Table 6 
summarises mean responses in order of importance. The factors included two basic issues 
concerning the projected benefits from the assets financed (row 2) and the volatility of 
company earnings/cash flows (row 3). Several factors related to the traditional trade-off 
theory’s balance between the benefits and costs of using debt: interest tax shield benefits (row 
7); the availability of non-debt tax shields (row 10); interest costs (row 6); bankruptcy costs 
(row 9 and, indirectly, row 1); and the personal tax costs of lenders (row 13). Two agency 
cost factors were included: reducing free cash to control management (row 12); restrictive 
debt covenants (row 5). Two factors concerned corporate control issues: take-over target 
likelihood (row 11) and equity dilution (row 8). Finally, one factor focussed on 
customer/supplier attitudes (row 4), addressing the issue of firm-stakeholder interaction. 
 
< TABLE 6 about here > 
 
The most important factor in determining the appropriate debt level was ensuring long term 
survivability of the company. This suggests that avoidance of bankruptcy (or perhaps take-
over) features highly in debt level decisions. However, somewhat inconsistently, the direct 
factor ‘potential costs of bankruptcy’ was only considered fairly important, but with the 
highest response variability of all thirteen factors (standard deviation = 1.58). Similar results 
were found for ‘potential costs of bankruptcy’ in both Europe (BJK) and the US (G&H). The 
factor with the second-highest mean response was the projected cash flow/earnings from the 
assets financed. There was a relatively high level of agreement on the two main factors as 
indicated by the low variability. 
  
A group of three factors (rows 3-5) rated third highest in importance. Two of these related 
indirectly to bankruptcy costs while the third was an agency cost of debt; close behind (row 6) 
was the level of interest rates. Three of these four features are consistent with the trade-off 
theory. Similarly, of the next set of four factors grouped around a mean score of 3 (‘fairly 
important’), three also support the trade-off theory (rows 7, 9 and 10). However, one (row 8), 
avoiding the issue of equity and associated equity dilution, is consistent with the pecking-
order theory. 
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 Takeover prevention (row 11), disciplinary control of managers (row 12) and the personal tax 
cost of lenders (row 13) were not seen as particularly important, the latter suggesting that 
companies do not target a clientele of investors with certain tax characteristics. 
 
The second question concerning capital structure determinants asked respondents to indicate 
the extent of their agreement with 17 general statements in the context of UK listed 
companies’ financing decisions. Seven of the statements concerned the issue of asymmetric 
information (rows 1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 14 and 17), three considered agency costs (rows 4, 8 and 12) 
and two related to interest tax shield (rows 2 and 11). Statements also dealt directly with the 
trade-off theory (row 15), the pecking order theory (row 13), competitive strategy/agency 
costs (row 5), corporate control (row 16), and market frictions (row 10). A summary of 
respondents’ views, in descending order of agreement, is provided in Panel A of Table 7. 
 
< TABLE 7 about here > 
 
Respondents agreed most strongly that, in making debt and equity decisions, a company 
considers the market response to new issues of debt and equity (88% agreed). This suggests 
that respondents may be concerned, at least implicitly, about information asymmetry between 
management and investors, a justification for the pecking order theory. In addition, one of the 
three other statements receiving a ‘high’ level of agreement (> 60% agreed) relates to 
information asymmetry (row 3), while also reflecting managers’ general views that the market 
is not efficient in pricing equity (section 4(i) above). The other two relate to interest tax shield 
(row 2), and agency costs (row 4), consistent with the trade-off theory. 
 
Two further statements received ‘moderate’ agreement (> 40% agreed). One concerned 
competitive strategy/agency costs (row 5), and the other related to information asymmetry 
(row 6). 
 
Significant disagreement was recorded for seven statements. Respondents disagreed most 
strongly with the information asymmetry argument that issuing shares sends unfavourable 
signals concerning future long-term prospects (row 17; 75% disagreed). This response is not 
consistent with empirical evidence that share issues are associated with future return 
underperformance, on average (Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). 
Finance directors may not know about the evidence, may not believe it, or may not want to 
believe it since it would constrain their potential future financing choices. Respondents also 
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 strongly rejected the ‘corporate control’ argument that a company would issue shares to dilute 
the holdings of certain shareholders (row 16). 
 
Of particular interest is the strong rejection of the fundamental logic of the trade-off theory, 
that the present value of interest tax shields is balanced with the present value of possible 
bankruptcy costs (row 15). However, given that this is inconsistent with other responses 
concerning elements of the theory (discussed above), one explanation might be that 
respondents were rejecting the notion of formal quantitative evaluation rather than the 
underlying logic. Nevertheless, the logic of the pecking order theory fares little better since 
respondents disagreed that a company issues debt when recent profits are not sufficient to 
fund activities (row 13). They also disagreed that share price usually declines when debt is 
issued (row 14) and, perhaps surprisingly, that the decision to issue debt or equity is affected 
by the existence of tax loss carry forwards (row 11). 
 
Respondents acknowledged the adverse consequences of bankruptcy from a personal 
perspective by rejecting the notion that, if bankruptcy occurred, finance directors would find 
comparable positions of employment elsewhere (row 12). This lends support to the Grossman 
and Hart (1982) argument that issuing debt may encourage directors to perform better in order 
to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
 
While many of the views are similar, comparison with the two recent surveys reveals some 
apparent differences in debt determinants between the UK, the US (G&H) and the rest of 
Europe (BJK). First, both surveys find that ‘financial flexibility’ is the most important factor 
affecting the appropriate amount of debt.  A similar question was not asked in the present 
survey though it could be argued that ‘ensuring the long-term survivability of the company’ 
(Table 6, row 1), the factor identified as the main determinant, is similar. Our results on 
financial slack (section 4 (v) and Table 5 above) are also indicative of the importance of 
financial flexibility in the UK. Further, BJK’s UK respondents identified ‘financial flexibility’ 
as the major debt determinant. Overall, the results for the UK are consistent with the 
importance of financial flexibility. 
 
Second, G&H found for the US that the company’s ‘credit rating’ was the next most 
important factor in determining debt levels, being almost as important as ‘financial 
flexibility’. As might be expected, their further analysis showed the ‘credit rating’ factor to be 
particularly important for large public companies (G&H, Table 6). In the present study, the 
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 specific question was not asked within the section concerning debt determinants. However, in 
another section, ‘maintaining a bond rating’ was one of the options provided as a response to 
the question ‘how is the maximum amount of debt financing determined?’. Just 4% of the 130 
respondents identified bond rating as important. Further, ‘credit rating’ was not considered 
particularly important by BJK’s UK respondents (being ranked 6th in importance). Thus, the 
influence of ‘credit rating’ appears to be much lower in the UK and indeed in Europe 
generally (BJK, Table 7). This is likely to result from the fact that relatively few companies in 
the UK are subject to credit rating. 
 
Third, respondents in the present survey agreed with the general statement that a company 
(not necessarily their own company) would issue debt when its equity was undervalued by the 
market (Table 7, row 3). However, this view was rejected in the US (G&H, Table 9) and even 
more strongly rejected in Europe including the UK (BJK, Table 8). This may represent a 
genuinely different attitude in the present survey, or it might reflect differences in the way 
that the question was worded. We were careful to frame some of our questions more 
generally, to reduce the potentially sensitive nature of a firm-specific question. The negative 
response in the other surveys to the direct question about whether undervaluation of equity 
affected the respondent’s firm’s debt policy might be reflecting concerns about how the 
market might react to the firm’s next debt issue. By contrast, our wording might be eliciting 
more genuine views about such sensitive issues. 
 
(vii) Size, gearing and industry effects 
The extent to which opinions on capital structure decisions are related to company size, 
gearing level and industry group factors was investigated. 
 
Size effects 
The likelihood of adopting a target capital structure was found to be associated with company 
size (Table 2, Panel A: χ2 = 8.51; p = 0.014). Further partitioning analysis (p. 194, Siegel and 
Castellan, 1988) confirmed that large companies were more likely to have a target capital 
structure, and that small companies were more likely to have no target; similar results were 
found in the US (G&H). This is consistent with the argument that large companies have 
greater control over their capital structure than small companies and may reflect large 
companies’ greater access to finance, their response to stock market pressures or deliberate 
internal policy choice. By contrast, the preference for a hierarchy of sources of finance was 
independent of company size (χ2 = 2.17; p = 0.339). However, large companies (71%) were 
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 more likely to maintain financial slack than medium (66%) or small (41%); the association 
between size and financial slack was highly significant (χ2 = 13.82; p = 0.001). This probably 
reflects the inability of small companies to create financial slack, but is also consistent with 
larger companies maintaining financial flexibility to reduce the need to raise external funds. 
 
Respondents from large companies are more positive than those from small companies in 
their response concerning three determinants of their own total debt level (Table 6): the tax 
advantages of interest deductions (row 7); avoiding the need to issue dilutive equity (row 8); 
and preventing the company from becoming a take-over target (row 11). The first indicates a 
greater concern for taxation issues that may reflect higher profitability in larger companies, 
lower agency costs or perhaps the higher tax rate that they often suffer. The second is 
somewhat surprising since small companies are likely to include more owner-managers than 
large. It possibly reflects the fact that small companies find it more difficult to access ‘new 
equity’ markets, so the prospect of an equity issue is not in the mind-set of managers. The 
third might reflect a greater awareness in large companies of the opportunities for using debt 
to reduce the likelihood of takeover or perhaps that takeovers, as potentially attractive exit 
strategies, are viewed positively by some small firm owner-managers. 
 
Only one significant company size-based difference was observed in Table 7. Large firms 
more strongly disagreed with the suggestion that share price usually declines when debt is 
issued (row 14), perhaps reflecting their greater experience of major debt issues. Overall, we 
observe far fewer size-related differences than the other recent studies (G&H, BJK), perhaps 
as a result of our focus on listed companies rather than the mix of private and public 
companies in the other studies’ samples. Their size and public/private results appear to be 
correlated leading to some ambiguity in interpretation of the impact of size per se. 
 
Gearing effects 
From the responses obtained, there is some evidence that high geared companies are more 
likely to adopt a target capital structure, and weaker evidence that they are more likely to 
follow a hierarchy of finance and to maintain financial slack than low geared companies. The 
statistical significance of the associations is sensitive to the particular definitions of gearing 
and to the test applied. The cause and effect relationship here is unclear. The evidence might 
suggest that companies that find themselves in a situation of high gearing focus more closely 
on controlling, or justifying, the high debt levels. Alternatively, companies that more 
deliberately adopt a particular capital structure strategy might be able to accommodate (or 
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 justify) higher gearing levels. Unfortunately, it is also possible that gearing is proxying for 
size here. Although absolute levels of company size and gearing are not significantly 
correlated, the three size categories are significantly positively associated with the three 
gearing categories. 
 
In relation to Table 6, respondents from highly geared companies are particularly concerned 
about projected cash flows (row 2), presumably whether they will cover interest charges. Not 
surprisingly, they are also more focussed on debt covenants (row 5) than companies with low 
gearing. The relative importance of other (non-interest) tax shields (row 10) to high geared 
companies is consistent with the argument that these can be substitutes for interest in seeking 
to minimise tax liabilities (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
 
Two significant differences were observed in Table 7. High geared companies were more 
ready to accept the view that a company would issue debt when equity is undervalued by the 
market (row 3); this might be ex post justification that the respondents’ own company’s high 
debt level is a rational consequence of information asymmetry. Low geared companies more 
strongly rejected the view that a company issues debt when recent profits are not sufficient to 
fund activities (row 13). 
 
Industry effects 
Cross-tabulations indicate that the likelihood of companies adopting a target capital structure, 
or of following a hierarchy of financial sources, is not associated with industry classification. 
Thus, there is little evidence here that companies within particular stock exchange sectors 
adopt similar financing strategies. By contrast, the likelihood of maintaining financial slack 
does seem to differ across sectors (χ2 = 12.93; p = 0.044). Further partitioning analysis shows 
that fewer companies in the non-cyclical consumer goods sector (39%) maintain slack, but 
more companies do so in the cyclical consumer goods (80%) and information technology 
(78%) sectors.14 The differences are consistent with the expected greater cash flow variability 
and operating risk in the latter two sectors. 
 
Industry variation in opinions on firm-specific financing decisions (Table 6) is found, with 
two significant differences observed. First, industry variation in the maintenance of slack 
(previous paragraph) is mirrored by reduced concern about projected cash flows/earnings 
(row 2) in information technology and cyclical consumer goods, and greater concern in non-
cyclical consumer goods. Utilities and resource sectors also have significantly greater concern 
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 about cash flows. A possible explanation might be that the different concerns about cash 
flows reflect current gearing levels. However, while there are (non-significant) differences in 
industry-average gearing levels, these do not appear to correlate with concerns about cash 
flows. Second, opinions on whether ‘preventing the company from becoming a take-over 
target’ influences a firm’s debt level (row 11) are cross-sectorally quite diverse. At one 
extreme, resources and information technology sectors argue that this is of little importance 
but, at the other, non-cyclical services (i.e. food and drug retailers) consider it to be 
moderately important. This may reflect industry-specific differences in take-over fears. 
 
Just one significant industry-sensitive response was observed in Table 7. Respondents’ views 
on the relationship between R&D dependence and gearing (row 5) were somewhat diverse 
(high standard deviation), with utilities disagreeing but resources companies agreeing quite 
strongly that gearing would be lower for R&D dependent firms. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
While respondents’ views on specific features of corporate financing decisions have intrinsic 
interest, the relationship between their views from practice and extant theories is of particular 
importance. Table 8 seeks to summarise the evidence from the questionnaire in relation to 
each of the theories and elements of theories. 
 
< TABLE 8 about here > 
 
Certain elements appear to have strong support and are generally consistent with results from 
UK regression studies (references in brackets): the tax advantage of debt interest (Walsh and 
Ryan, 1997); the need for collateral in debt contracts constraining the use of debt (asset 
tangibility influence: Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Adedeji, 1998; Bevan and Danbolt, 2004); 
consideration of the market response to debt or equity issues (Marsh, 1984); and companies 
issuing debt when they feel that equity is undervalued. Respondents’ concern about long-term 
company survivability is difficult to reconcile with UK regression results which report a 
positive relationship between debt and earnings variability (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993). 
 
On the other hand, certain arguments are strongly refuted. Perhaps surprisingly, respondents 
do not agree that interest tax shields are formally balanced with bankruptcy costs, one of the 
fundamental features of the trade-off theory. There are, however, potential behavioural 
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 explanations for the other four refutations. For example, respondents do not consider the 
personal tax circumstances of debt providers but, given the difficulty of doing so, this is 
perhaps not surprising. Similarly, they do not accept the agency theory argument (a supposed 
benefit) that using debt commits a large proportion of cash flow to interest payments thereby 
acting as a control on management’s potential excesses. Again, this may not be surprising 
since it requires an admission by managers’ that their and other stakeholders’ objectives are 
sometimes in conflict. Respondents do not agree that shares are issued to dilute certain 
shareholders’ interests, perhaps because this may denote self-interested (unethical?) political 
manoeuvring against some shareholders, or simply because managers have not been in a 
position where it was necessary to contemplate such an action. Finally, as suggested earlier, it 
is not surprising that managers do not believe that issuing shares sends unfavourable signals 
to the market. 
 
There is evidence that many of the theoretical arguments are accepted by a significant number 
of respondents: the importance of interest tax shield (consistent with Walsh and Ryan, 1997), 
financial distress, agency costs (consistent with Walsh and Ryan, 1997 and, for large 
companies, Lasfer, 1998) also, at least implicitly, information asymmetry. The use of debt as 
an instrument in corporate control situations is not generally accepted. 
 
Consistent with the trade-off theory, half of the respondents consider that their firms adopt a 
target capital structure. But 60% claim to follow a hierarchy of sources of finance, and these 
firms tend to rank the attractiveness of sources as expected in the pecking order theory. While 
59% of firms maintain financial slack, this flexibility is valued by firms generally rather than 
just by ‘hierarchy’ firms. The two ‘competing’ capital structure theories are not accepted as 
mutually-exclusive (or exhaustive) by all respondents, since some firms adopt (at least 
partially) both strategies, while a significant number of firms do not appear to follow either of 
these strategies. Such observations raise concerns about the usefulness of large-scale 
regression modelling of capital structure determinants. In normal usage, these models can 
only describe whether a particular theory is consistent with the observed capital structure of 
the ‘average firm’ in the population. They are not typically used to model the diversity of 
capital structure practice.  
 
As with most UK regression-based determinant studies (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Lasfer, 
1995; Bevan and Danbolt, 1998; Ozkan, 2001; Bevan and Danbolt; 2004), there is clear 
evidence that company size affects corporate financing decisions. For example, large 
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 companies are more likely to adopt a target debt level and to maintain financial slack (though 
not more likely to follow a hierarchy of finance). Similarly, current high levels of gearing 
encourage a greater focus on particular issues such as projected cash flows, loan covenants 
and non-interest tax shields. This contingency on debt levels suggests that empirical studies of 
capital structure dynamics may be particularly fruitful (see, for example, Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) and references therein; and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) for an illustration of the 
difficulties involved). In contrast with some UK regression studies (Bennett and Donnelly, 
1993; Adedeji, 1998), there is little evidence here that firms in specific industries adopt 
similar financing strategies; however, the importance of financial flexibility in terms of 
maintenance of financial slack does appear to be industry-related. 
 
The views expressed in the present UK survey are broadly similar to those reported for the US 
(G&H) and for other European countries (BJK), a notable difference being the importance of 
‘credit rating’, which relates to an environmental characteristic of the different countries. One 
further difference is our observation of fewer capital structure determinants that vary 
according to respondent company size. The higher number of size-related determinants in the 
other studies possibly reflects the mix of private and public companies in their samples. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Overall, the results suggest that current theories of capital structure all contribute to decision-
making practice though certain aspects of the theories are strongly refuted. Importantly, 
finance directors’ opinions are not fully consistent with either of the main theories. There are 
several possible reasons for this. Clearly, the capital structure decision is a complex, multi-
dimensional problem. Humans have bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), so it would be 
surprising if all factors were considered. In addition, some responses may reflect 
organisational inertia, which makes organisations slow to adapt to changes in the relevant 
environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Moreover, financing decisions are likely to be the 
product of complex group processes. Capital structure theory is not (yet) able to capture these 
complexities. Although dynamic regression models are beginning to recognise that 
relationships might vary over time, models that incorporate elements of both trade-off theory 
and pecking order theory might be a fruitful line of enquiry. 
 
The study also suggests that attention should be given to seeking a better understanding of the 
diversity and complexity of firms’ capital structure decisions rather than simply describing the 
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 associations between capital structure outcomes and firm-specific characteristics for the 
‘average firm’. In view of our finding that managers do not believe the market to be efficient, 
future research might also usefully consider alternative decision models which are less 
founded on rational economics. In-depth case study observations of individual firms’ 
financing decisions, and particularly of changes over time would be especially valuable in 
exploring this diversity and related behavioural effects.  
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 ENDNOTES 
                                                 
 
1 Tufano’s (2001) definition of clinical research, ‘empirical work that examines a relatively small number of 
events intensively’, encompassed case study research, small-scale research such as industry-level studies and 
surveys. He suggested that large-sample empirical evidence, while seeking to reject theories, often ends up 
simply confirming them, which is a much weaker form of research.  
 
2 It is feasible to specifically model the possibility of different financing approaches being adopted by firms. For 
example, Dissanaike et al. (2001) found evidence that one financing approach is not likely to be descriptive for 
all UK firms. 
 
3 Large sample studies offer statistical power and cross-sectional variation but often have weaknesses related to 
variable specification and the inability to ask qualitative questions. Intensive case studies (less commonly used in 
finance research) offer excellent detail and allow the exploration of unique aspects of corporate behaviour, but 
necessarily involve small samples and usually give sample-specific, non-generalisable, results. The survey 
approach offers a balance between these two extremes. Moderately large samples provide statistical power and a 
broad cross-section of sample firms; at the same time, very specific and qualitative questions about behaviour 
and contextual factors can be asked. Of course, survey analysis is not without its own potential problems. These 
include the risk that respondents are not representative of the population of firms, and that the survey questions 
may be misinterpreted or misunderstood. 
 
4 Questions on the responding company’s leasing policy were addressed in Section C (five pages) and are 
reported in a separate paper (Beattie et al., 2003). 
 
5 The three size sub-samples (n = 66), based on total assets, were: large > £140m ≥ medium ≥ £27.7m > small. 
The three gearing sub-samples, based on total debt/equity MV, were: 619% ≥ high ≥ 37% > medium > 8% > 
small ≥ 0%. 
 
6 At the time the questionnaire was issued (during the financial year ending 31 March 2001), the standard UK 
corporation tax rate of 30% applied to companies with taxable profits above £1.5 million. This tapered down to 
20% for profits between £50-300,000 and down to 10% for profits below £10,000. 
 
7 Including 225 negative responses, the overall response rate was 50%. The major reasons given for negative 
response were lack of time/staff availability/too busy (40%), and company/individual policy not to respond to 
questionnaires (24%).  
 
8 A questionnaire investigating ‘lease accounting reform’ was sent out over a similar time period to the 
remaining one-third of the UKQI population. Respondents to this survey were invited to request the ‘leasing and 
corporate financing decisions’ questionnaire and six requested and completed the questionnaire. 
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9 The 198 companies of the responding finance directors ranged in size (total assets) from £17,288 million down 
to £701,000 with a mean and median of £872 million and £71 million, respectively. The population mean and 
median were £637m and £52m, respectively.  
 
10 These tests suffer from a number of well-known limitations; see Wallace and Mellor (1988) and Wallace and 
Cooke (1990) for discussions. 
 
11 More specifically, the number of respondents who felt that their company’s ordinary shares are fairly priced 
0% of the time (i.e. never) was 26; 1-25% of the time was 63; 26-75% of the time was 73; 76-99% of the time 
was 24; and 100% of the time (i.e. always) was 2. 
 
12 Not surprisingly, there was a strong degree of association (χ2 = 36.2; p < 0.001) between companies that 
‘believe there is a maximum debt level that should not be surpassed’ and companies that measure gearing. Of the 
47 companies that said they did not measure gearing, 13 had zero total debt. 
 
13 Percentages sum to more than 100% as 16 respondents ticked more than one option. 
 
14 It was necessary to combine the three sectors with small representation in the sample for the formal chi-
squared test and the combined grouping was close to the overall average for maintenance of slack. 
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Table 1: Findings of prior survey research on capital structure determinants
Author(s) Year Respondents
Response  
rate  Conclusions drawn by author(s)
US Setting
Donaldson 1961 25 large US na Hierarchy of financing sources
corporations Supports pecking order theory
Scott & 1982 CFO's of 21% Firms have target leverage ratios and accept the notion of optimal
Johnson 212 of Fortune capital structure
1000 firms Supports trade-off theory
Pinegar & 1989 CFO's of 35% Evidence supports the use of a financing hierarcy
Wilbricht 176 of Fortune Supports pecking order theory
500 firms
Norton 1989 CFO's of 21% Some evidence of target ratios, hierarchy of sources. No evidence of
98 of Fortune a trade-off or asymmetric information or agency costs.
500 firms Mixed evidence
Graham & 2001 CFO's of 9% Target debt ratio to maintain financial flexibility. Moderate importance of
Harvey 392 of Fortune tax implications, less emphasis on financial distress. Interest cost of
500 firms and debt of moderate importance.
4400 FEI Supports trade-off theory
members Moderate evidence that debt issued when recent profits insufficient and
(4587 population) equity issues affected by market valuation.
No significant consideration of agency costs/benefits, corporate control
Supports pecking order theory
Settings other than US
Fawthrop 1975 54 major UK na Use of debt ratios to constrain debt limits. Importance of maintaining
& Terry corporations financial flexibility. 
Stonehill 1975 Firms in US, na No debt ratio maintained, take advantage of favourable opportunities to
et al. Japan, France, issue debt or equity. 
Norway, Holland Conflicting both pecking order  and trade-off theories
Allen 1991 48 listed na Some evidence on target debt ratios and tax implications of debt. Most
Australian concern with maintaining spare debt capacity. Internal funds marginally
corporations favoured. Supports pecking order theory
Allen 1999 132 Australian 24% UK and Australian firms maintain spare debt capacity to be in a position
67 Large UK 13% to seize opportunities or make acquisitions. Supports pecking order theory
53 Japanese 10% Not so in Japanese firms.
Bancel 2004 87 firms across 12% Financial flexibility/EPS dilution major concerns in debt/equity decisions.
& Mittoo 16 European Country's legal environment important determinant of debt policies.
countries Costs and benefits trade off determines financing.
Supports trade-off theory
Brounen 2004 313 firms across 5% Financial flexibility major debt determinant, but not driven by asymmetric
et al. UK, Netherlands, information. Firm size and shareholder orientation important influences
France & Germany on financing but national influences weak.
Supports trade-off theory  but also evidence of pecking order behaviour.
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Table 2: Companies that adopt a target capital structure and influences on  the target level
Question asked 
Panel A
To what extent does your company seek to maintain a target capital structure by using approximately 
constant proportions of debt and equity finance (even if the policy is one of zero debt finance)?
Company size (No of companies)
Target Large Medium Small Total
No target 22 35 38 95 (49%)
Target 43 30 28 101 (51%)
65 65 66 196 (100%)
Panel B
For companies with a target capital structure:
What is your company's target amount of debt?
[expressed as a proportion of total (i.e. debt plus equity) finance]
Target debt range No of cos % of cos
0% 6 7
1 - 25% 19 22
26 -50% 43 51
51 -75% 11 13
76-100% 3 4
> 100% 3 4
85 100
Mean (Median) 45% (40%)
Minimum (Maximum) 0% (300%)
Panel C
Who/what is influential in setting target capital structure ratios?
Rank the following in order of importance (1 being most important, 9 being least important)
Mean standard Grouping2
rank1 deviation
1 Company senior management 1.65 1.54 1
2 Existing shareholders 4.10 2.23   2
3 Commercial bankers 4.77 2.45   2  3
4 Investment bankers 5.06 2.61       3  4
5 Debt covenants 5.29 2.67       3  4
6 Outside investment analysts 5.70 2.41           4
7 Potential shareholders 5.72 2.20           4
8 Comparison with ratios of industry competitors 6.37 2.23             5
9 Major trade creditors 7.86 1.72               6
Notes
1. Table is ordered by mean rank
2. Grouping based on statistical difference between rankings at 5% (2-tail), using 
    Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
(n = 83)
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Table 3: Ranking of long-term finance by companies that follow a hierarchy
 of finance sources
Source of long-term finance Mean standard Grouping3
rank1,2 deviation
1 Internal reserves 1.67 1.08 1
2 Straight debt 2.64 1.29   2
3 Finance leases 4.31 1.94     3
4 Operating leases 4.47 1.98     3
5 Ordinary shares 4.57 2.21     3
6 Convertible debt 5.98 1.78       4
7 Straight preferred shares 7.02 1.02         5
8 Convertible preferred shares 7.62 0.74           6
Notes
1. Respondents ranked the eight sources from 1 (most favoured) to 8 (lease favoured)
2. Table is ordered by mean rank
3. Grouping based on statistical difference between rankings at 5% (2-tail), using 
    Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
(n = 112)
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Table 4: Cross-tabulation of number of companies adopting a target capital 
structure and those following a hierarchy
Hierarchy Yes No Total
Yes 61 (32%) 52 (28%) 113 (60%)
No 34 (18%) 42 (22%) 76 (40%)
95 (50%) 94 (50%) 189 (100%)
Note
The null hypothesis of independence between 'target' and 'hierarchy' 
cannot be rejected (χ2 = 1.55; p = 0.213)
Target
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Table 5: Spare borrowing capacity
Panel A: Policy Yes No
Does your company have a policy for maintaining spare borrowing 
capacity? (n=193) 59% 41%
Panel B: Amount
% of existing total long-term borrowing maintained as spare No of cos % of cos
1 - 25% 41 64%
26 -50% 17 27%
51 -75% 2 3%
76-100% 4 6%
64 100%
Mean (Median) 29% (20%)
Minimum (Maximum) 0% (100%)
Panel C: Source
For companies who maintain spare borrowing capacity (n=114)
Nature and source of spare borrowing capacity     %1
Overdraft facility 73
Unsecured loans 32
Leasing/hire purchase 21
Secured loans 20
Mortgage lending 4
Debentures 2
Other 12
Note
1. Percentages exceed 100% as respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
    Nature and source are shown in descending order of frequency
Panel D: Reasons
For companies who maintain spare borrowing capacity (n=114)
Reasons for spare borrowing capacity     %1
Unplanned opportunities 68
For acquisitions 54
Reserve for crisis 44
For special projects 31
Other 8
Notes
1. Percentages exceed 100% as respondents were asked to tick all applicable options
2. Reasons are shown in descending order of frequency
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Table 6: The relative importance of factors in choosing the appropriate amount of debt
Question asked Mean1,2 Grouping3
Please indicate the relative importance  of the following factors in choosing
the appropriate amount of total debt (even if zero) for your company.
1 Ensuring the long term survivability of the company 4.41 1
2 Projected cash flow or earnings from assets financed 4.21   2
3 Volatility of the company's earnings and cash flows 3.72     3
4 Ensuring customers /suppliers are not worried about the company's survival 3.62     3  4
5 Restrictive covenants imposed by debt providers 3.58     3  4
6 Level of interest rates 3.52         4  5
7 Tax advantage of interest deductions to the company 3.34             5  6
8 Avoiding the need to issue equity (which would dilute existing shareholders' 
claims/voting proportions)
3.25                 6  7
9 Potential costs of bankruptcy, near-bankruptcy or financial distress 2.95                     7  8
10 Level of other non-taxable deductions (e.g. capital allowances) available to 
the company
2.93                         8
11 Preventing the company from becoming a take-over target 2.54                           9
12 Ensuring that a large proportion of cash flow is committed to interest 
payments to provide a disciplinary control on management
2.46                           9
13 Personal tax cost your investors face when they receive interest income 2.02                             10
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1 = not important at all; 2 = of little importance; 3 = fairly important;
    4 = important; 5 = very important; table is ordered by mean response
2. Tests of response relationships with company size, gearing level and industry group were undertaken 
    and results are reported in Section 4(vii) of the text
3. Grouping based on statistical difference between rankings at 5% (2-tail), using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
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Table 7: Views on general statements regarding capital structure determinants
Question asked Mean1,2,3
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following general statements
 in the context of UK listed companies’ financing decisions.
1 In making debt and equity decisions, a company considers the market response to new issues. 4.20***
2 Use of debt would decrease relative to equity if bond interest were no longer tax deductible. 3.79***
3 A company would issue debt when equity is undervalued by the market. 3.70***
4 If a company could issue unsecured long term debt at the same after-issue, after-tax cost of secured debt, 
it would increase its use of debt financing.
3.66***
5 If a company were more dependent on R&D for its success, its debt to equity ratio would be lower. 3.33***
6 Private placements offer a satisfactory exchange of information between a company and investors 
without publicising proprietary information in full.
3.30***
7 A decision to issue long term debt sends a favourable signal to the market about future long term 
prospects.
3.10
8 Restrictive covenants might be suggested in the hopes of convincing a doubtful  lender to grant a loan. 2.99
9 A company issues shares when prices are high, even though present needs are not great, in order to build 
up a long term fund cushion.
2.89
10 Issuing debt is delayed because of transaction costs and fees, and retiring debt is delayed because of 
recapitalisation costs and fees.
2.89
11 The decision to issue debt or equity is affected by the existence of tax loss carry forwards. 2.86**
12 If bankruptcy occurred, finance directors would, in general, find comparable positions elsewhere. 2.58***
13 A company issues debt when recent profits are not sufficient to fund activities. 2.56***
14 Share price usually declines when debt is issued. 2.40***
15 The present value of interest tax shields is balanced with the present value of possible bankruptcy costs. 2.26***
16 A company would issue shares to dilute the holdings of certain shareholders. 2.18***
17 A decision to issue shares sends an unfavourable signal to the market about future long-term prospects. 2.07***
Notes
1. Response categories are: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neutral; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree
    Table is ordered by mean response
2. Significance of t-test of whether mean response is significantly different from 3 = neutral;
     *** and ** = significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (2-tail test) 
3. Tests of response relationships with company size, gearing level and industry group were undertaken 
    and results are reported in Section 4(vii) of the text  
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Table 8: Summary of evidence on capital structure theory from present survey
EVIDENCE
Theory and theory elements Table(row) or
text section Strong Weak Weak Strong
Traditional trade-off theory [1]
Direct evidence
Trade-off between interest tax shield and distress costs 7 (15) X
Target capital structure: strict/flexible 2 (panel A) X
Reluctance to deviate from existing capital structure text S4(iv) X
Interest tax shield [1A]
Interest rates 6 (6) X
Tax advantage of interest deductions 6 (7) X
Personal tax cost facing lenders 6 (13) X
Non-interest tax shields 6 (10) O
Tax advantage of interest deductions 7 (2) X
Debt/equity issue is affected by existence of tax loss carry forwards 7 (11) X
Financial distress [1B]
Potential costs of financial distress 6 (9) O
Ensuring long-term survivability 6 (1) X
Ensuring customers/suppliers not worried about co survival 6 (4) X
Volatility of earnings/cash flow 6 (3) X
High level of R&D (increasing likelihood of financial distress) 7 (5) X
Extended trade-off theory [2]
Agency costs [2A]
Restrictive covenants imposed by debt providers 6 (5) X
Collateral constraints on debt 7 (4) X
High level of R&D (low level of tangible assets) 7 (5) X
Agency benefits [2B]
Interest as large part of cash flow to control management 6 (12) X
Restrictive covenants suggested to doubtful lenders 7 (8) O
Finance directors aware of personal costs of bankruptcy 7 (12) X
Pecking order theory [3]
Direct evidence
No target debt ratio 2 (panel A) X
Willingness to deviate from existing capital structure text S4(iv) X
Following a hierarchy of financial sources text S4(iv) X
Internal resources most favoured 3 X
Issuing debt when recent profits insufficient to fund activities 7 (13) X
Debt favoured over equity 3 X
Use of debt avoids need to issue equity 6 (8) O
Volatility of earnings/cash flows 6 (3) X
Maintenance of financial slack 5 (panel A) X
Underlying assumption of asymmetric information
Consideration of market response to debt/equity issues 7 (1) X
Private placements to avoid revealing proprietary info 7 (6) X
Decision to issue debt sends favourable signals 7 (7) O
Decision to issue shares sends unfavourable signals 7 (17) X
Belief that share price declines when debt is issued 7 (14) X
Issue debt when equity is undervalued 7 (3) X
Issue shares when prices high to build up fund cushion 7 (9) O
Corporate control [4]
Debt prevents co from becoming a takeover target 6 (11) X
Issue share to dilute certain equity holdings 7 (16) X
Against theory Supports theoryNeutral
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